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‘But’ Implicatures: A Study of the
Effect of Working Memory and
Argument Characteristics
Leen Janssens and Walter Schaeken*
Laboratory for Experimental Psychology, Department of Brain and Cognition, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
This study aimed to investigate the possible cognitive costs involved in processing the
implicatures from but and the conclusion introducing words so and nevertheless. Adult
participants were asked to indicate the conclusion that the person in the story would
make, based on ‘p but q’ sentences constructed as indirect distancing contrasts.
Additionally, while performing this task, participants’ working memory was burdened
with a secondary dot recall task in four conditions ranging from no working memory
load to high load. The results showed that working memory load did not influence
participants’ performance on the implicature task. This finding might be interpreted to
suggest that working memory is not involved in inferring the implicatures from but,
so, and nevertheless. We also found that the content of the arguments played a
very important role. Whenever a strong argument is combined with a weak argument,
participants mostly base their conclusion on the strong argument and consequently
ignore the conventional interpretation of but (and so and nevertheless). Additionally, we
found an effect of axiological value, which is in line with the positive–negative asymmetry
theory.
Keywords: conventional implicatures, but, working memory, automaticity, context
INTRODUCTION
When people communicate with each other, they tend to follow a cooperative principle to make
their message easily understood by all interlocutors (Grice, 1989). This implies to follow some
rules that Grice describes as maxims. This cooperative principle allows interlocutors to derive
implicatures, i.e., inferences that consist of attributing to a speaker an implicit meaning that goes
beyond the explicit linguistic meaning of an utterance. Consider the following example:
(1) Some students passed the exam.
The utterance in (1) will be interpreted as “Not all of the students passed the exam.” If all of the
students had passed the exam, (1) would still be logically true. However, the hearer can assume that
the interpretation of ‘some’ as ‘not all’ holds because the speaker wants his utterance to be optimally
understood by the hearer by being as informative as possible. The inference from (1) that not all
the students passed the exam is an example of a conversational implicature.
There are, however, implicatures that are not derived from the cooperative principle and
are therefore independent of its four maxims. They are called conventional implicatures. These
implicatures are attached by convention to particular lexical items or linguistic constructions. Grice
(1975) wrote the following about them:
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“In some cases the conventional meaning of the words used will
determine what is implicated, besides helping to determine what is
said. If I say (smugly), He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave,
I have certainly committed myself, by virtue of the meaning of my
words, to its being the case that his being brave is a consequence
of (follows from) his being an Englishman” (Grice, 1975, p. 44).
The use of the word therefore implies a consequence link
between the two sentences. This link, however, does not
contribute to the truth conditions of the sentence “he is an
Englishman” nor of the sentence “he is brave.” Indeed, if a
sentence ‘p therefore q’ is true, it follows that ‘p and q’ is true, and
therefore, that p is true and that q is true too. The contribution of
therefore is in other words non-truth-conditional; it is not needed
for the truth-conditional analysis. This idea is also expressed in
the following definition by Horn (2004):
“Unlike an entailment or logical presupposition, this type of
inference is irrelevant to the truth conditions of the proposition.
This inference is not cancellable without contradiction, but it is
detachable, in the sense that the same truth-conditional content
is expressible in a way that removes (detaches) the inference.
Such detachable, but non-cancellable aspects of meaning that are
neither part of, nor calculable from, ‘what is said’ are conventional
implicatures.” (Horn, 2004, p. 4)
The implicatures stemming from the connector but are
classically also described as conventional implicatures. This claim
will be questioned in the current paper. The materials used in our
experiment consist of ‘p but q’ sentences (‘p maar q’ in Dutch,
the language in which the experiment is carried out) in which but
operates as a distancing contrastive connector, more specifically
as an indirect one. In a distancing contrast, but connects two
parts of a complex speech act and the second part is dissociated
from the first part, without explicitly denying what is being
expressed in the first part (Van Belle and Devroy, 1992). The
speaker endorses or recognizes that p is true (Van Belle, 2003).
However, but prevents the inference that would normally be
derived from p. This can happen in two ways. The first possibility
is that q contains a conclusion that contradicts the inference from
p. Consider the following example (Van Belle, 2003):
(2) The milk is sour, but I drink it.
On the basis of p, one expects that the speaker will not drink
the milk. However, q contradicts directly this expectation. This is
an example where but operates as a direct distancing contrastive
connector, sometimes also called a ‘concluding but’ (Van Belle
and Devroy, 1992).
The second possibility is the one that is investigated in this
article. In this construction q consists of an argument that leads
to an expectation that contradicts the expectation from p. For
example:
(3) The milk is sour, but I am thirsty.
The inference from p is that the speaker in (3) will not drink
the milk. The inference from q, however, is that the speaker
will drink the milk. Anscombre and Ducrot (1977; see also Van
Belle, 2003; Potts, 2015) claim that the second phrase in such an
indirect distancing contrast has more weight. Consequently the
conclusion follows that the speaker will drink the milk.
The conclusion from a ‘p but q’ sentence can be introduced
by words like so (dus in Dutch) or nevertheless (toch in Dutch).
So and nevertheless also demonstrate that words might have no
effect truth-conditionally, but still carry information. The word
so elicits the inference from q as the conclusion. In other words,
from (3), it follows:
(4) So I will drink the milk.
One can say that so strengthens the inference from
but, or, stated differently, it signals that the previous
information/expectation explains the next fact. It is important to
notice that so plays no role in the truth conditions of (4). In other
words, (4) is true if and only if it is true that
(5) I will drink the milk.
This truth-conditional analysis does not mean that so has
no purpose in the sentence. It signals that what follows is
causally linked with the previous information. In contrast to the
previous truth-conditional analysis, the word nevertheless cancels
the inference from but and elicits the inference from p as the
conclusion from (3):
(6) Nevertheless I will not drink the milk.
As with so, nevertheless does not play a role in the
truth conditions of (6), although it signals something, i.e.,
that what will be presented is in contrast with previous
information/expectation. Indeed, (6) is true if (7) is true, and false
otherwise:
(7) I will not drink the milk.
Janssens and Schaeken (2013) investigated experimentally
how people understand but, so, and nevertheless. They presented
63 adult participants with such ‘p but q’ sentences followed
by either two so-conclusions or two nevertheless-conclusions.
Participants were asked what the person in the story would
conclude. Janssens and Schaeken (2013) aimed to find out
whether people understand but, so, and nevertheless as predicted
by the literature on conventional implicatures, or if other factors,
like the content of the sentences, were driving the interpretation.
If conventional implicatures were the driving force behind
the interpretation, people would choose the inference from
p when the conclusion with nevertheless is asked and the
inference from q when the so-conclusion is asked. The p- and
q-arguments were either both sensible (i.e., they both made
sense) or a combination of a sensible and an irrelevant argument.
According to the account of Anscombre and Ducrot (1977)
implicatures stemming from but, so, and nevertheless should lead
to a certain conclusion, irrespective of the (relevance of the)
content of the arguments. The results showed that, although
people seemed to follow the conventional implicatures, the
content of the arguments also greatly influenced participants’
answers. When a sensible argument was combined with an
irrelevant argument, participants mostly based their conclusion
on the sensible argument. Even when a combination of two
sensible arguments was presented, performance was not perfect.
A plausible interpretation of the imperfect performance is
that the content of the arguments often prevails over the
implicatures that could be drawn from the ‘p but q’ sentences.
This interpretation is in line with the results of Experiment
2 in Janssens and Schaeken (2013), where participants had to
justify their responses. When reasoners gave an unconventional
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conclusion (i.e., not in line with what is predicted on the basis
of the literature about the conventional implicatures of but, so,
and nevertheless), they tended to refer to the content of that
argument. Another finding from Janssens and Schaeken (2013)
was that nevertheless elicited more unconventional answers than
so. They argued that this might be attributed to the fact that the
nevertheless doesn’t actually evoke the inference from p as was
predicted. There are, however, alternative explanations. It might
be that nevertheless evokes the negation of the conclusion from
q. This negation does not necessarily mean the inference from
p. Indeed, after (3) one might for instance say “nevertheless I’m
hesitating.” Another plausible explanation is in terms of effort.
In order to reach the conventional nevertheless-conclusion from
p, the implicature from but (i.e., the inference from q) has to be
overruled, which seems likely to be effortful.
There are no existing theories claiming that there is or should
be specific processing costs involved in processing these specific
but implicatures. However, according to Blakemore (1987) and
Iten (2005), but encodes a specific procedure. In the context
of Relevance Theory, Blakemore (2002) developed a procedural
analysis of but. This analysis asserts that but “encodes a constraint
that triggers an inferential route involving contradicting and
eliminating an assumption that is manifest in the context” (in
Hall, 2004, p. 220). Iten (2005) refined Blakemore’s analysis of
but and claimed “what follows (q) contradicts and eliminates an
assumption that is accessible in the context.” If we try to translate
these in terms of processing costs, it seems fair to argue that
the contradiction and elimination procedure is requiring extra
processing costs. In order to reach the conventional conclusion
from a ‘p but q’ sentence as an indirect distancing contrast,
one must infer the specific conclusion from p and the specific
conclusion from q (which is opposite to the conclusion from
p). Additionally, but implies that the second argument weighs
more heavily so that the putative conclusion of p is eliminated
and the final conclusion is inferred from q. As a consequence,
four inferences should be made in order for this final conclusion
to be reached. Stated more formally, the inference steps are
the following (where p stands for the p-argument, q for the
q-argument, and r for the conclusion you can derive from the
respective arguments):
(1) p but q
(2) (p→ r) but (q→¬ r)
[=Introduction of the expected conclusion that follows
from the arguments in (1)]
(3) r and ¬ r
[=Contradiction that follows from (2)]
(4) ¬ r > r
[=The bigger weight of the not-r conclusion, on the basis
of the but-implicature]
(5) ¬ r
[=Solving the contradiction in (3) by eliminating the
conjunct that has the smallest weight in (4)]
(6) ∴ So not-r is the case.
The inference steps 2 and 4 are an expression of the
implicatures attached to but, inference steps 3 and 5 are
inferences, which are needed in order to be able to complete the
reasoning process. Moreover, when the but-sentence is followed
by nevertheless, the processing costs might be even higher. After
the contradiction and elimination of the conclusion following the
p-argument, encountering nevertheless forces the listener to undo
the elimination (or eliminate and contradict the conclusion from
the q-argument):
(1) p but q
(2) (p→ r) but (q→¬ r)
[=Introduction of the expected conclusion that follows
from the arguments in (1)]
(3) r and ¬ r
[=Contradiction that follows from (2)]
(4) ¬ r > r
[=The bigger weight of the not-r conclusion, on the basis
of the but-implicature]
(5) ¬ r
[=Solving the contradiction in (3) by eliminating the
conjunct that has the smallest weight in (4)]
(6) ¬¬ r [=Negation of (5) after encountering nevertheless]
(7) ∴ Nevertheless r is the case.
An alternative account might be that people reverse the
inference in step (4) after being confronted with the contradiction
in (3) and the word nevertheless. This means that step (5) also
could be
(5) ¬ (¬ r > r )
The subsequent reasoning steps would be:
(6) ¬ r ≤ r
(7) ∴ Nevertheless r is the case.
Thus, reasoning in line with the ‘contradiction and
elimination’ view of Blakemore (1987) and Iten (2005),
together with the general finding from Janssens and Schaeken
(2013) that drawing these implicatures doesn’t happen flawlessly,
induces the possibility that processing but is cognitively effortful
and therefore requires specific cognitive capacity. In rule-based
accounts of reasoning (see e.g., Braine and O’Brien, 1991;
Rips, 1994), the number of reasoning steps influences the
difficulty directly, because of their working memory load. In this
perspective, the extra reasoning step needed for nevertheless,
which might involve a double negation, a well-known difficult
reasoning operation (see e.g., Schroyens et al., 2001), should
tap working memory resources even more, therefore making
nevertheless more difficult than so. Also the alternative account
of the reasoning steps for nevertheless, where one reverses the
already made but-implicature, clearly demands extra resources.
Moreover, a closer look at the inference steps 2 and 4,
which are an expression of the implicatures attached to but
as a distancing contrastive connector, reveals that they have
certain properties of conversational implicatures. One specific
feature that characterizes conversational implicatures but not
conventional implicatures is that they are cancellable. In the
next paragraph we will explain that the well-known conventional
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implicature but is not immune for cancelation, which is
surprising from a theoretical point of view.
First, there are sentences in which but connects two parts
and the use of but creates a contrast between the two parts. For
example:
(8) She is blonde, but she is intelligent.
The use of but in (8) elicits, in Grice’s terms (1975), the
implicature that being blonde contrasts with being intelligent (at
least in the speaker’s view) although this contrast is not explicitly
expressed. This contrast is an indefeasible inference from but.
The use of the word but implies a contrastive link between the
two parts of the sentence. This link, however, does not contribute
to the truth conditions of the sentence “she is blonde, but she
is intelligent.” The previous sentence and “she is blonde and
intelligent” are both true if p is true (“she is blonde”) and at the
same time q is true (“she is intelligent”). The contrast in (8) is
due to the fact that but comes with an implicature that and lacks.
Since it is part of the conventions of English that but is used this
way, Grice calls it a conventional implicature (Geurts, 2010, p. 8).
Second, but can also be used in sentences in which the inferences
from the p- and q-argument already contrast each other. Example
(3) (about sour milk but being thirsty) is an example of such a
but-sentence. The implicature from but indicates that the second
part of the argumentation (q) attains more weight (Anscombre
and Ducrot, 1977). The use of but in sentence (8) seems indeed
to be in line with a classical conventional implicature, i.e.,
a non-cancellable implicature. However, this is not true for
the use of but in sentence (3), which is the type that will
be discussed in this paper. For example, by using nevertheless
the implicature from but is canceled. Nevertheless denies the
inference from but and guides the hearer or reader toward
the inference from p. In other words, languages even have a
discourse marker to signal the cancelation, namely nevertheless.
As a consequence, the implicatures related to but may not
be purely conventional, because they have certain features of
conversational implicatures. Indeed, the differential weighting of
the p- and q-argument seems not to be conventional because it
is cancellable. This similarity with conversational implicatures is
an important reason why the possibility arises that processing
implicatures from but may require similar cognitive processes
and capacities as conversational implicatures.
A substantial part of the experimental research on scalar
implicatures has focused on the cognitive processes underlying
these inferences. There is, however, no consensus in the literature
with respect to the possible cognitive processing costs associated
with deriving scalar implicatures. Indirect evidence suggesting
that deriving scalar implicatures is cognitively effortful can be
found in developmental research. Noveck (2001), among others,
found that children are more logical than adults with terms such
as might and some. Because children’s cognitive capacities aren’t
fully developed yet, this was considered as indirect evidence
that working memory capacities are involved in deriving scalar
implicatures. Likewise, Bott and Noveck (2004, Experiment
4) observed that the number of pragmatic answers dropped
when participants were forced to answer quicker, indicating
that pragmatic inferences require processing costs. De Neys
and Schaeken (2007) presented even more direct evidence.
They burdened adult participants’ working memory capacity
by providing them with a secondary task during performance
of the scalar implicature task. When working memory was
burdened, pragmatic inferences dropped by 10%. Marty et al.
(2013) replicated this working memory load effect associated with
computing the scalar implicature from some (see also Noveck and
Posada, 2003; Huang and Snedeker, 2009; Dieussaert et al., 2011).
In contrast, other literature doesn’t seem to find any
processing costs for scalar implicatures. For example, Marty
et al. (2013) found an opposite working memory effect on
numerical implicatures. Also, Feeney et al. (2004) found that
working memory capacity was associated with providing the
logical interpretation on infelicitous some statements. They
argued that working memory is involved in inhibiting the
pragmatic interpretation in favor of the logical one. Other
evidence suggesting that there is no role for working memory
was provided by Grodner et al. (2010). They showed in a visual-
world study that there was no delay associated with the pragmatic
inference from some compared to other, non-scalar expressions.
Hence, the implicature generation takes place as soon as some
is encountered, before the full sentence is processed. Similar,
Heyman and Schaeken (2015) observed in a latent class analysis
that working memory capacity did not explain the interindividual
variability in the interpretation of infelicitous some statements. In
sum, findings concerning the possible cognitive processing costs
associated with deriving scalar implicatures are not consistent.
This mixed evidence and the possibility of cancelation of
the indirect distancing contrastive but (which gives but a
characteristic of a conversational implicature) makes it worth
looking into the processing costs underlying these specific
implicatures from but.
Janssens et al. (2015) replicated Janssens and Schaeken (2013),
but their participants were children aged 8–12. Additionally,
working memory capacity was measured by means of the
Listening Span task (Daneman and Carpenter, 1980). Their
results were similar to the adult results in Janssens and
Schaeken (2013), but children’s competence with but seemed
worse than adults’ competence (although a direct comparison
between adults and children was not made). Because children’s
working memory capacity isn’t yet fully developed, this could
indicate that working memory is involved in processing
implicatures from but. However, no effect of working memory on
children’s performance was found. This finding, in turn, suggests
that working memory would not be involved in processing
implicatures from but as an indirect distancing connector.
In sum, there are some good reasons to investigate whether
working memory is involved in processing but. The primary
aim of the present study is thus to examine if working memory
is involved in processing the implicatures from but, so, and
nevertheless in those cases where but is used as an indirect
distancing contrastive connector. We will not measure working
memory capacity, but we will use the same paradigm as De
Neys and Schaeken (2007) in scalar implicature research. We will
look at the effect of working memory load on but-implicature
competence by imposing a secondary task on participants that
burdens working memory capacity. If the implicature requires
specific effortful processing, deriving the implicature should be
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harder when cognitive resources are burdened. We want to
emphasize that pragmatic theorists and previous experimental
studies have not characterized the exact nature of the alleged
effortful processing. The present study focuses on the role
of executive working memory resources. These resources are
widely recognized as the essential component of human cognitive
capacity (see e.g., Engle et al., 1999).
Apart from the main question of our study (the effect of
working memory load), we aim to answer three extra questions.
First, we want to investigate if the relevance of the arguments
can overrule the expectations that accompany but, so, and
nevertheless. Previous but-research showed a strong effect of
content with adults (Janssens and Schaeken, 2013) and children
(Janssens et al., 2015). Content and context have a profound effect
on many pragmatic phenomena (see e.g., Bambini et al., 2016,
for an effect of context on metaphors), as with the closely related
conversational implicature some, content and context effects are
observed (see e.g., Breheny et al., 2006; Bonnefon et al., 2009,
2011; Heyman et al., 2012).
Actually, if one wants clear answers about the content-effect,
Janssens and Schaeken (2013) and Janssens et al. (2015) did
use a methodology that was not fully satisfying. They presented
sentences with sensible arguments, and also sentences with
irrelevant arguments. For instance, in a story where someone
doubts whether or not he will eat chocolate, the person thinks:
“Chocolate is very tasty, but I have blond hair.” It is clear that
the second argument is in principle irrelevant with respect
to the question of whether the person will eat chocolate. For
sentences with an irrelevant argument, participants did choose
the conclusion stemming from the sensible argument regardless
of the direction suggested by but, so, or nevertheless. For the
example above, the majority of participants did choose the
conclusion “so he will eat chocolate,” although the combination
of but and so should have made participants to infer the negation
of the conclusion expected from the p-argument. Janssens and
Schaeken (2013) interpreted the high number of these answers
as a strong sign for the importance of the content. However,
these ‘awkward’ sentences might have confused the participants.
The complete irrelevance of one of the arguments might
have canceled the differential weighting of the arguments and
might have led participants to focus exclusively on the sensible
argument. Therefore, in the present study a more ecologically
valid measure is used to study the effect of the content.
Participants are now presented with weak and strong arguments
instead of, respectively, irrelevant and sensible arguments as in
Janssens and Schaeken (2013). By manipulating the strength of
the arguments we hope to investigate the effect of content in a
more natural way. On the basis of the previous experiments, we
expect strong arguments to overrule the direction suggested by
but, so, or nevertheless.
Second, we want to exclude a simple alternative explanation
for the claim of Anscombre and Ducrot (1977) that the
q-argument has more weight. It simply might be that the last
argument in a sequence always gets more weight. This alternative
explanation was overlooked in previous research. To rule it
out, the effect of the instruction word but will be assessed
by comparing performance on sentences including but with
sentences in which the arguments are simply juxtaposed. If
order is important, also in simply juxtaposed sentences, the last
argument should have more weight. However, given previous
findings and theorizing about but, we predict that the q-argument
only gets more weight in combination with but.
Third, we want to verify the impact of the axiological value
of the arguments. Anscombre and Ducrot (1977) used the term
‘axiological value’ to describe the argumentative orientation of an
argument, which is determined by a positive or negative value
that can be ascribed to its content. Arguments whose axiological
value is oriented toward a positive conclusion are labeled ‘positive
arguments’ and their counterparts ‘negative arguments.’ For
example, suppose a person who hesitates to buy a necklace. She
says: “I really like the necklace, but it is very expensive.” In this
example, the p-argument (liking the necklace) is the positive
argument because it is oriented toward the positive conclusion
(she will buy the necklace). The q-argument (very expensive) is
the negative argument because it is oriented toward the negative
conclusion (she will not buy the necklace). Janssens and Schaeken
(2013; see also Janssens et al., 2014) did not find an effect
of the axiological value. There were no systematic differences
between the items with negative or positive arguments in their
study. Therefore, we do not expect an effect of this variable.
Nevertheless, in light of the importance of replication in science
(Open Science Collaboration, 2015), we treat axiological value as
a possible confounding variable and we add it as an extra variable
in the design.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
A total of 210 undergraduate students from the University of
Leuven (Belgium) with a mean age of 19.2 participated in our
experiment. They were all native Dutch speakers and received
course credit in exchange for participation.
Implicature Task
Every participant was presented with 16 short context stories,
adapted from Janssens and Schaeken (2013). These stories,
programmed in E-Prime 1.1, were presented on a computer and
were followed half the time by two ‘p but q’ constructions and
half the time by two ‘p. q’ constructions. For example (translated
from Dutch):
Mom and Ella are shopping. Ella sees a lovely teddy bear lying on
the shelves. She asks Mom if she can have the teddy bear. Mom is
not sure.
Mom thinks: “Ella has been bad, but she lost her teddy bear.”
or
Mom thinks: “Ella has been bad. She lost her teddy bear.”
After each argumentative construction (either ‘p but q’ or ‘p.
q’), the participants were told to indicate the conclusion that
the person in the story would make, based on the construction
of his/her utterance. They were explicitly told not to take into
account the decision they themselves would make. For the
example above, the so-conclusions they had to choose between
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are “so Ella can have the teddy bear” and “so Ella cannot have
the teddy bear.” Next, the participants were presented with a
different pair of arguments from the same type (e.g., Mom thinks:
“Ella already has a lot of teddy bears, but she’s been very good
lately”). Now, they had to judge two conclusions form the second
conclusion type (e.g., “nevertheless Ella can have the teddy bear”
and “nevertheless Ella cannot have the teddy bear”). Both the 16
stories and the so- and nevertheless-conclusions were presented in
a random order. In the Supplementary Data Sheet 1, the materials
of a concrete trial are provided. In contrast to Janssens and
Schaeken (2013), we did not use irrelevant1 arguments but we did
make a distinction between weak and strong sensible arguments.
In the example above, both the p- and the q-argument are strong
sensible arguments. In the same context, an example of two weak
sensible arguments is Mom thinks: “I’m in a hurry, but it is a lovely
teddy bear.”
In order to choose plausible and good arguments for our
constructions, we performed two pilot studies. In a first pilot
study, 16 participants were instructed to read stories in which
a person was always confronted with a ‘dilemma’ (e.g., a girl
received some chocolates and has to decide whether or not
to eat chocolate). We asked the participants to give both an
argument why a person should do something (e.g., ‘being hungry’
is an argument to eat chocolate) and an argument for why she
shouldn’t (e.g., ‘being allergic to chocolate’ is an argument not to
eat it). In a second pilot study we asked 16 different participants to
rate the arguments that were generated in the first pilot study on
a scale from 1 (very weak argument) to 7 (very strong argument).
Based on these two pilot studies we created our experimental
set. For both the constructions separated by a ‘period’ and
the but constructions, there were four possible combinations
of arguments: strong–strong, strong–weak, weak–strong, and
weak–weak. Moreover, we also took into account the axiological
value of the arguments. The argumentative orientation can be
positive or negative. A negative argument (e.g., “Ella has been
bad”) is oriented toward a negative conclusion (she cannot
have the teddy bear), whereas a positive argument (e.g., “Ella
lost her teddy bear”) is oriented toward a positive conclusion
(she can have the teddy bear). This led to a 2 × 2 × 2 × 4
design (2 connectors: but or ‘period’ × 2 conclusion types: so or
nevertheless× 2 axiological value combinations: negative-positive
or positive–negative × 4 argument combinations: weak–weak,
weak–strong, strong–weak, and strong–strong).
Working Memory Load Task
We manipulated working memory load in order to determine
whether the number of conventional responses would be lower
when working memory is burdened. For our working memory
manipulation, we used a secondary task based on the Double
Task Paradigm used in De Neys and Schaeken (2007). We created
four load conditions, whereby participants were presented with
a matrix with three, four, or six dots. A matrix was displayed
for 850 ms before each of the 16 stories and participants had to
remember the position of the dots in order to reproduce them
1Note that ‘irrelevant’ is labeled as ‘absurd’ in the original Janssens and Schaeken
(2013) study.
in an empty matrix. After the matrix, the short context story
appeared on the screen. The participant could take as much time
as they want to read the story. When they pressed the space bar,
the story disappeared and the first (but- or ‘period’-) sentence
appeared, together with the first choice between two conclusions
(two so- or two nevertheless-conclusions). These two conclusions
were presented under each other, preceded by a number. When
the participant had indicated his or her response (by typing
the number), the second (but or ‘period’) sentence appeared,
together with the second choice between two conclusions
(two nevertheless-conclusions if the two so-conclusions were
presented for the first sentence, and two so-conclusions if the two
nevertheless-conclusions were presented for the first sentence).
After the participant indicated the response, the sentence and
the conclusions disappeared. An empty matrix appeared and the
participant had to reproduce the previously presented matrix.
In the low load condition, participants were presented with a
3 × 3 matrix with three dots that were always horizontally or
vertically positioned. The moderate load condition was similar,
but the dot pattern was more complex to remember. In this
condition, participants were presented with a 3 × 3 matrix with
four randomly positioned dots. In the high load condition, there
were six randomly positioned dots in a 4× 4 matrix. Finally, as a
control, there was a no load condition in which the participants
were not presented with matrices but were simply asked to
perform the implicature task.
Procedure
The participants individually performed the task in five groups of
up to 50 students at the same time. In each group, the participants
were randomly assigned to the different working memory load
conditions. All participants were presented with the 16 stories,
followed by two questions about the conclusion. This means
that every participant answered one item of every sentence type.
Meanwhile the participants performed the working memory load
task. The whole task lasted approximately 12 min per participant.
RESULTS
Results of Working Memory Load Task
We calculated the average number of correctly reproduced dots
in every load condition. In the low load condition the average
number of correctly reproduced dots was 2.78 out of 3 (93%). In
the moderate load condition, participants averagely reproduced
3.45 dots out of 4 (86%) correctly. Finally, in the high load
condition, the average number of correctly reproduced dots was
4.31 out of 6 (72%). This means that participants performed
fairly well on the dot recall task. This was important: avoiding
both floor effects and ceiling effects is essential in order to expect
differences in working memory load. For this reason, we removed
all participants in every load condition whose performance was
less than two SD’s below the average of their condition. We
removed two participants from the low load condition (n = 60),
three from the moderate load condition (n = 53) and one from
the high load condition (n= 32). This left us with a total data set
of 204 participants.
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Results on the but-Task
First, we calculated correlations between performance on the dot
recall task and performance on the implicature task. In the low
load condition we found a correlation of −0.005 (p = 0.97).
In the moderate load condition, the correlation was 0.054
(p= 0.7) and the high load condition yielded a correlation of 0.31
(p = 0.089). These correlations indicate that there is no trade-
off between the working memory load task and the implicature
task.
For our main analyses a generalized linear mixed model with
a logit link function was used (see e.g., Baayen et al., 2008; Jaeger,
2008; Bates et al., 2011). The dependent variable was the accuracy
score (0 or 1; conventional or unconventional conclusion). The
model fitting procedure was implemented in R using the lmer()
function from the lme4 package. We increased model complexity
until the best model fit was reached. Model fit was assessed
through the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). We included
a random intercept of participants in the final model (to capture
the potential degree of heterogeneity of participants) and no
random slopes for participants (because we expect similar effects
of our variables on participants). All fixed effects variables were
dummy-coded. For a complete description of the results, see the
Supplementary Data Sheet 2.
The final model includes main effects of connector, conclusion
type, axiological value combination and argument combination; a
two-way interaction between conclusion type and connector; and
a three-way interaction between axiological value combination,
argument combination and conclusion type. We did not find
an effect of working memory load: there were no significant
differences between the load conditions in the mean accuracy
scores. These mean accuracy scores for each load condition are
depicted in Figure 1.
The Supplementary Data Sheet 3 displays a summary of the
final model in which the intercept is compared with all other
variables. T-tests were performed to further analyze significant
effects in the model. There was a significant main effect of
connector: but (M = 0.58, SD= 0.16) leads to more conventional
answers than the ‘period’ [M = 0.55, SD = 0.15; t(203) = 2.312,
p = 0.022]. Additionally, there was a significant main effect
of conclusion type: so (M = 0.60, SD = 0.143) leads to more
conventional answers than nevertheless [M = 0.53, SD = 0.163;
t(203) = 6.127, p < 0.001]. Moreover, there was a main effect
of axiological value: ‘positive–negative’ (M = 0.61, SD = 0.259)
leads to more conventional answers than ‘negative–positive’
[M = 0.51, SD = 0.243; t(203) = 5.107, p < 0.001]. Finally,
there was a significant main effect of argument combination
FIGURE 1 | Proportion of conventional answers for each of the four load-conditions.
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FIGURE 2 | Proportion of conventional answers as a function of
connector (but or period) and conclusion type (so or nevertheless).
[F(3,609) = 8.635, p < 0.001]. There were less conventional
answers on strong–weak (M = 0.52, SD= 0.175) than on strong–
strong (M = 0.58, SD = 0.193; p < 0.001), and on weak–strong
(M = 0.591, SD= 173; p= 0.149). Figure 2 displays the two-way
interaction between connector and conclusion type. When the
connector but separates the two arguments, the mean accuracy
score is significantly higher for so-conclusions (M = 0.64,
SD= 0.48) than for nevertheless-conclusions [M= 0.51, SD= 0.5;
t(3262) = 7.28, p < 0.001]. However, when the two arguments
are separated by a ‘period,’ the mean accuracy scores don’t
differ significantly between so- and nevertheless-conclusions [so:
M = 0.56, SD = 0.5; nevertheless: M = 0.54, SD = 0.5;
t(3262)= 0.70, p= 0.48]. There are more so-conclusions with but
than with ‘period’ [but: M = 0.64, SD = 0.48, ‘period’: M = 0.56,
SD= 0.5; t(203)=−5.403, p < 0.001].
Concerning the three-way interaction, Figures 3A–D display
the interactions between conclusion type and axiological value
combination for each of the different levels of argument
combination. In order to deal with multiple testing, Bonferroni
correction was used, which set the significance cut-off at
0.000625. When a weak p-argument is combined with a
strong q-argument, the axiological value combination ‘positive–
negative’ leads to more accurate answers than ‘negative–positive’
for nevertheless [so/neg-pos: M = 0.79, SD = 0.41; so/pos-
neg: M = 0.85, SD = 0.36; t(814) = −2.28, p = 0.023]
(nevertheless/neg-pos: M = 0.27, SD = 0.45; nevertheless/pos-
neg: M = 0.45, SD = 0.50; t(814) = −5.41, p < 0.00001]. We
find the same results for the combination of a strong p-argument
with a weak q-argument [so/neg-pos: M = 0.33, SD = 0.47;
so/pos-neg: M = 0.38, SD = 0.49; t(814) = −1.39, p = 0.17]
[nevertheless/neg-pos: M= 0.60, SD= 0.49; nevertheless/pos-neg:
M = 0.78, SD = 0.41; t(814) = −5.86, p < 0.00001]. When two
arguments of the same strength are presented, we see reverse
patterns for strong–strong and weak–weak. In both these cases,
it depends on the conclusion type whether ‘positive–negative’
or ‘negative–positive leads to more accurate answers. When
both arguments are weak, the axiological value combination
‘negative–positive’ leads to more accurate answers than ‘positive-
negative’ for so-conclusions, but to less accurate answers for
nevertheless-conclusions [so/neg-pos: M = 0.70, SD = 0.46;
so/pos-neg: M = 0.51, SD = 0.50; t(814) = 5.68, p < 0.00001]
[nevertheless/neg-pos: M= 0.42, SD= 0.49; nevertheless/pos-neg:
M = 0.62, SD = 0.49; t(814) = −5.56, p < 0.00001]. When both
the p- and q-argument are strong arguments, we find the reverse
pattern, with the exception that the difference for the nevertheless-
conclusions is not significant [so/neg-pos: M = 0.50, SD = 0.50;
so/pos-neg: M = 0.74, SD = 0.44; t(814) = −7.27, p < 0.00001]
[nevertheless/neg-pos: M= 0.55, SD= 0.50; nevertheless/pos-neg:
M = 0.54, SD= 0.50; t(814)= 0.49, p= 0.62).
Additionally, we performed two post hoc exploratory analyses,
one on the asymmetric conditions (weak–strong and strong–
weak) and one on the symmetric conditions (weak–weak and
strong–strong). This was inspired by the asymmetry that is visible
in Figures 3A,B between the strong–weak and the weak–strong
combination. We performed the same analysis as the original one.
Hence, the dependent variable was again accuracy; we included
a random intercept of participants in the final model and no
random slopes for participants. Again, all fixed effects variables
were dummy-coded. For a complete description of the results,
see the Supplementary Data Sheet 4. Here, we want to highlight
two important points of these post hoc exploratory analyses. First,
also for these models, adding working memory does not lead to
an improvement of the model fit, neither when we add working
memory as a main effect nor when working memory is part of an
interaction. Second, the interaction between conclusion type and
argument combination was significant for both extra analyses,
but the pattern was different. For the asymmetric conditions,
the difference between so and nevertheless was significant for the
weak–strong combination [so: M = 0.82, SD= 0.21; nevertheless:
M = 0.36, SD = 0.29, t(203) = 18.069, p < 0.001] and also
for the strong–weak combination, but in the other direction
[so: M = 0.35, SD = 0.29; nevertheless: M = 0.69, SD = 0.24,
t(203) = −12.016, p < 0.001]. For the symmetric conditions,
the difference between so and nevertheless was in both conditions
significant, but now so was always easier than nevertheless [for the
strong–strong combination, so: M= 0.62, SD= 0.24; nevertheless:
M= 0.55, SD= 0.26, t(203)= 3.116, p < 0.02; for the weak–weak
combination, so: M = 0.60, SD = 0.26; nevertheless: M = 0.52,
SD= 0.25, t(203)= 3.506, p < 0.001].
DISCUSSION
The primary aim of the present study was to investigate if working
memory is necessary during the processing of the implicatures
from but. There were four working memory load conditions in
order to explore whether a higher burden on working memory
capacity would significantly decrease the number of conventional
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FIGURE 3 | Proportion of conventional answers as a function of conclusion type (so or nevertheless) and axiological value (neg–pos or pos–neg) for
each of the four types of argument combination (weak–strong, strong–weak, weak–weak or strong–strong).
answers. Additionally, our experimental design enabled us to
investigate the effect of three other variables. First, we made
a distinction between weak and strong arguments instead of
irrelevant and sensible arguments, which provides a more reliable
measure of the effect of content of the arguments. Second, we
made a comparison between the connectors but and ‘period’ to
explicitly look at the effect of but. Third, we manipulated the
axiological value of the arguments, to control if the null effect
of previous findings could be replicated in a better designed
study.
Our best fitting model included a two-way interaction
between conclusion type (so and nevertheless) and connector (but
and ‘period’), a three-way interaction between conclusion type,
argument combination and axiological value combination
and the main effects of all these variables. We will
discuss the consequences of these results for our different
hypotheses.
The Role of Working Memory
The working memory load variable was not included in the
best fitting models for the data. This finding is line with the
results in Janssens et al. (2014), who measured working memory
capacity in children and found no relation with their performance
on the implicature task. This suggests that processing the
implicatures from but, so, and nevertheless used in ‘p but q’
sentences as indirect distancing contrasts happens effortlessly
without involvement of working memory. In what follows, we
will place this putative conclusion into perspective, by discussing
four aspects.
First, this null effect might have consequences for the
theoretical underpinnings of but. A procedural analysis of
but (with the ‘contradiction and elimination’ principle; see
Blakemore, 1987; Iten, 2005) seems to suggest that processing
but is effortful. Since our results showed that deriving these
implicatures does not seem to be effortful, one can doubt this
‘contradiction and elimination’ view. Hall (2004, 2007) already
postulated that the clause introduced by but does not eliminate
an assumption, but merely introduces an argument that points
in a different direction. She explicitly says “the implication of
the second clause . . . does not entirely seem to replace the
implication of the first clause . . . It just has more weight, and
this is all that follows from the constraint I’m proposing.” (Hall,
2004, p. 229). The proposal of Hall is less demanding with respect
to working memory costs, because the elimination is not part of
it. Her argumentation might make it more understandable why
we did not find that processing but is cognitively effortful. In
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addition, one could claim that this prediction can also be derived
from Grice’s theory. For example, Moeschler (2012) wrote:
“This is a very important point in Grice’s definition of a
conversational implicature, because only conversational
implicatures are supposed to be worked out. When an implicature
is automatically triggered, through a reference to the meaning
of a word, the implicature is conventional.” (Moeschler, 2012,
p. 417).
Second, we investigated only one type of but-sentences (with
but indicating an indirect distancing contrast). One could argue
that the implicatures from but investigated in this paper are
not purely conventional. One of the major characteristics of a
conventional implicature is that this inference is not cancellable
without contradiction (see Horn, 2004). However, the more
heavily weighting of the q-argument in the indirect distancing
contrastive ‘p but q’ sentences can be canceled, for instance
when nevertheless introduces the conclusion (and sometimes
even when so introduces the conclusion, as our participants
clearly did). Hence we are not making any claims about working
memory involvement in other types of but or in conventional
implicatures in general.
Third, the correlations between the number of correctly
reproduced dots and accuracy on the implicature task did
not support the idea of a trade-off between the two tasks.
This finding is also in line with the conclusion that working
memory doesn’t seem to influence the implicatures investigated
in this study. However, we also found that the percentages of
correctly recalled dots were highest in the low load condition
and lowest in the high load condition. One might argue that,
if processing these specific implicatures from but, so, and
nevertheless truly happens automatically, then we should expect
these percentages on the dot recall task to be equal for each
load condition. It can be argued that participants might have
invested an equal amount of working memory capacity into
the implicature task and that this goes at the expense of
performance on the dot recall task (especially in the high load
condition). However, this suggestive explanation seems unlikely
since the percentages of correctly reproduced dots were fairly
high, so we would have at least expected a difference with
the no load condition (which was not found). Moreover, the
moderate load condition in our study corresponds to the high
load condition in the original De Neys and Schaeken (2007)
study. This means that our high load condition was truly
highly burdening and therefore a lower percentage of correctly
reproduced dots compared to the other two load conditions is
not surprising.
Fourth, the observed null effect of working memory must
be seen in a wider picture. There is a difference between the
task in the current paper on the one hand and for instance
the task of De Neys and Schaeken (2007) on scalars on the
other hand. In the latter study, there is no correct answer. Some
refers to an indeterminate amount; therefore some is compatible
with some and not all, but also with all. In other words, some
is ambiguous and when interpreting some, participants have
to decide, based on contextual information, to go either for
the reading with or for the one without the scalar implicature.
However, but, so and nevertheless are not ambiguous in the
way some is ambiguous: their meaning is clear. One only has
some freedom in taking care of the weights of the arguments
when coming to an interpretation. It might well be that working
memory resources play a different role in these cases. This point
can be made clear by using the framework offered by Chemla
and Singh (2014a,b). In their stimulating review study, Chemla
and Singh provide evidence that the derivation process of scalar
implicatures is indeed costly. However, their careful analysis
identified different possible derivation processes and it is not clear
what in the derivation process of a scalar implicature creates an
extra cost. The research of Marty and Chemla (2013) suggests
that the processing of the alternatives is not the most effortful
part in the derivation of implicatures, but that the decision
step (the choice between the two readings) is the costly process
(however, see van Tiel and Schaeken, 2016). The current data can
be interpreted as in line with this hypothesis. Indeed, there is no
need to disambiguate between two readings when interpreting
a but-sentence, because there is just one reading. One only
has to play with the weights of the arguments. Nevertheless,
we want to refrain from too strong conclusions about working
memory involvement, because our study on its own does not
allow to conclude that working memory is not involved at
all.
The Role of Arguments Order
The two-way interaction in the model (between conclusion type
and connector; see Figure 2) is informative with respect to
our hypothesis about the effect of order. Indeed, it provides
evidence that the conclusion from so leads to more conventional
answers than the conclusion from nevertheless, at least when
but separates the p- and q-argument. This means that but
is interpreted in line with the expectations expressed in the
introduction and contributes to the understanding of so and
nevertheless. The inference from but directs the reader toward
the conclusion from the q-argument and the use of so following a
but-sentence confirms and strengthens this conclusion. However,
nevertheless requires the reader to overrule the inference from
but in favor of the conclusion from p. When a ‘period’ separates
the p- and q-argument, there is no indication which of the two
arguments has more weight and therefore what conclusion is
the expected one. Consequently, there is no significant difference
in the number of conventional answers between so-conclusions
and nevertheless-conclusions in the period-condition. Moreover,
there are less conventional so-conclusions in the period-
condition than in the but-condition. Therefore and as predicted,
we seem to be able to rule out the alternative explanation that
the q-argument gets more weight simply because it is the last
given argument. However, it’s still possible that some reasoners
interpret nevertheless as a word that gives freedom with respect
to making the inference from the p- or from the q-argument. We
will come back to this last issue in the paragraph on the role of
content and axiological value.
When people interpret a sequence of sentences, they want
to relate portions of the text or sentences. Rhetorical relations
(also called discourse relations or coherence relations) have been
proposed as an explanation for the construction of coherence
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in discourse (see e.g., Lascarides and Asher, 1993; Asher and
Lascarides, 2003). Examples of rhetorical relations are condition,
motivation, purpose, and volitional cause. But makes the
rhetorical relationship in the but-condition explicit (contrast),
but reasoners can of course infer a rhetorical relationship
themselves in the period-condition. Given the fact that we had
combinations of (pretested) sensible arguments in the current
experiment, although with a different orientation, it seems fair to
argue that most participants have inferred the contrast-rhetorical
relation. Therefore, the difference between the but-conditions
and period-condition for the so-conclusions is really convincing
evidence in favor of the hypothesis that it is but that leads to
a different weighting. Because a signaled rhetorical relation (by
means of but) might be easier to construct than an unsignaled
one (in the period-condition), we only used the period-condition
as a control for the temporal order hypothesis and not for the
working memory involvement hypothesis.
The Role of Content and Axiological
Value
The three-way interaction, although difficult to interpret, seems
to be informative with respect to our hypotheses about the role
of content and the axiological value. We had not anticipated an
effect of axiological value combination. The variable was basically
added as a control variable, although we wanted to verify its
null effect found in previous studies. The role of the argument
combination variable, however, was not unexpected. Previous
studies (albeit in a maybe methodologically less precise way)
already gave evidence for the effect of content.
Figure 3C depicts the situation in which two weak arguments
are presented. It can be argued that this is not an obvious
situation. Compared to weak–strong and strong–weak, none of
the two arguments stands out over the other. Compared to
strong–strong, the weak–weak construction only contains weak
arguments and it may be less clear which inference stems from
these weak arguments. Figure 3C shows that in this weak–
weak situation, people make more correct inferences from a
positive argument than from a negative argument for both
so and nevertheless. This can be deduced from the fact that
the axiological value combination ‘negative–positive’ leads to
more conventional so-conclusions than ‘positive–negative’ and
the opposite applies for nevertheless. Since conventional so-
conclusions are inferred from the q-argument and nevertheless-
conclusions from the p-argument, this means that positive
arguments facilitate the conventional conclusion in weak–weak
situations.
The same seems to hold for other less obvious situations
with different argument combinations. We found that,
overall, nevertheless-conclusions elicited more unconventional
conclusions than so-conclusions and for these nevertheless-
conclusions a positive argument seems to facilitate the
conventional conclusion compared to a negative argument
as well. This can be seen in Figure 3A (weak–strong) and
Figure 3B (strong–weak). However, this does not hold for
the nevertheless-conclusions when p and q are both strong
arguments. In those sentences, there was no significant difference
between ‘positive–negative’ and ‘negative–positive.’ The fact
that in general nevertheless is better understood with a positive
p-argument might be seen as evidence in favor of the claim that
reasoners are able to interpret nevertheless as pointing toward the
conclusion from the p-argument, at least when the circumstances
are ideal, i.e., when not too much processing is required and a
preferred axiological value construction is used.
When we look at the so-conclusions, a reverse pattern
seems to emerge. In the strong–strong (Figure 3D) situations,
the axiological value combination ‘positive–negative’ leads to
significantly more conventional so-conclusions than ‘negative–
positive,’ which implies that a negative argument facilitates the
conventional conclusion in these situations. This difference
between ‘positive–negative’ and ‘negative–positive’ is not
significant for the so-conclusions in the strong–weak situations
(Figure 3B). This can be explained by the fact that this is the
least obvious so-conclusion to make, since it requires the reader
to ignore a strong argument in favor of a weak argument. This
explanation, however, does not match with the absence of a
difference in the weak–strong situation. Here the reader has in
principle only an easy job to do, that is, ignore a weak argument
in favor of a strong one.
These results seem to be somewhat in line with the positive–
negative asymmetry theory (Peeters and Czapinski, 1990; Taylor,
1991; Rozin and Royzman, 2001). Lewicka (1988, 1998) has
demonstrated that this theory can account for human deviations
from normative models of reasoning (see e.g., Verschueren et al.,
2006). According to the theory, human information processing
bears the marks of a general tendency to have greater subjective
necessity associated with avoiding negative outcomes than with
obtaining positive outcomes. The general trend we observe is that
so-conclusions are easier with the negative–positive form, while
the opposite is true for nevertheless. In both cases this means
that the conclusion is easier when it is based on the positive
argument (q in the case of so and p in the case of nevertheless).
We do not have a clear explanation yet why and how exactly this
effect interacts with the strength of the arguments. Nevertheless,
our results indicate that emotional factors can penetrate the
interpretation process in a very subtle yet influential way. The
current experiment seems to show that even non-intrusive but-
sentences change depending on whether people read a positive
or negative p- or q-argument. However, since the effect of
axiological value combination was unexpected, the proposed
analysis remains suggestive. Therefore, replication and variation
studies are mandatory in order to firmly establish this positive–
negative effect and the interaction with the strength of the
arguments.
The two extra analyses not only confirmed the null-effect of
working memory, they also revealed an interesting extra finding.
For the weak–strong combination, we observed more expected
so-conclusions than nevertheless-conclusions; for the strong–
weak combination, we observed more expected nevertheless-
conclusions than so-conclusions. This interaction can be phrased
differently, namely, for both combinations participants just
preferred conclusions on the basis of the strong argument, which
is the q-argument for the weak–strong combination and the
p-argument for the strong–weak combination. This seems to
indicate that participants were strongly driven by the strength
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of the arguments in the asymmetric condition. This observation
is in line with Hall’s (2004; 2007) theory. She claims that
the q-argument does not eliminate an assumption, but merely
announces an argument that points in a different direction.
The q-argument has more weight and is preferred over the
p-argument, but when the content of the p-argument allows it,
a conclusion can be drawn from p. Hence, Hall (2004, 2007)
indirectly emphasizes the significance of the content of the
arguments.
CONCLUSION
This experiment showed that, when presented with but-
constructions indicating an indirect distancing contrast, people
tend to attribute more weight to the q- than the p-argument. The
experiment also showed that participants under a high working
memory load did not perform significantly different from
participants under a low working memory load or whose working
memory was not burdened at all. Concerning the different
conclusion types, we found that more unconventional answers
are given when participants have to infer the nevertheless-
conclusion than when they have to infer the so-conclusion. We
also found that the content of the arguments played a very
important role. Whenever a strong argument is combined with
a weak argument, participants mostly base their conclusion on
the strong argument and consequently ignore the conventional
interpretation of but (and so and nevertheless). Hence, even
sensible arguments can get annulled simply because they are
weak and measured against a stronger argument. The latter effect
might be modulated by the axiological value of the arguments.
In other words, the strength or perceived relevance of the p- and
q-arguments can override the expectations elicited by but, so and
nevertheless: content and context are important forces during our
interpretation process.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
All authors contributed to this article, both substantively and
formally. LJ and WS prepared the experiment. LJ performed
the experiment and did the statistical analysis. WS did the data
interpretation. LJ was the driving force in writing the first version
and WS of the final version. All authors contributed equally to
the editing of the manuscript and approved the final version of
the manuscript.
FUNDING
This work was supported by the National Council for Scientific
Research – Flanders, Belgium (FWO) under Grant G.0634.09.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We would like to thank our reviewers for their constructive
remarks. Their requests, suggestions and advices greatly
improved the paper.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found
online at: http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.
2016.01520/full#supplementary-material
REFERENCES
Anscombre, J., and Ducrot, O. (1977). Deux ‘mais’ en français? Lingua 43, 23–40.
doi: 10.1016/0024-3841(77)90046-8
Asher, N., and Lascarides, A. (2003). Logics of Conversation. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Baayen, R. H., Davidson, D. J., and Bates, D. M. (2008). Mixed-effects modeling
with crossed random effects for subjects and items. J. Mem. Lang. 59, 390–412.
doi: 10.1016/j.jml.2007.12.005
Bambini, V., Bertini, C., Schaeken, W., Stella, A., and Di Russo, F. (2016).
Disentangling metaphor from context: an ERP study. Front. Psychol. 7:559. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00559
Bates, D., Maechler, M., and Bolker, B. (2011). lme4: Linear Mixed-Effects Models
Using S4 Classes, R Package Version 0.999375-42. Available at: http://www.R-pr
oject.org/
Blakemore, D. (1987). Semantic Constraints on Relevance. Oxford: Blackwell.
Blakemore, D. (2002). Relevance and Linguistic Meaning: The Semantics and
Pragmatics of Discourse Markers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bonnefon, J. F., Feeney, A., and De Neys, W. (2011). The Risk of
Polite Misunderstandings. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 20, 321–324. doi:
10.1177/0963721411418472
Bonnefon, J. F., Feeney, A., and Villejoubert, G. (2009). When some is actually
all: scalar inferences in face-threatening contexts. Cognition 112, 249–258. doi:
10.1016/j.cognition.2009.05.005
Bott, L., and Noveck, I. (2004). Some utterances are underinformative: the
onset and time course of scalar inferences. J. Mem. Lang. 51, 437–457. doi:
10.1016/j.jml.2004.05.006
Braine, M. D. S., and O’Brien, D. P. (1991). A theory of if: a lexical entry,
reasoning program, and pragmatic principles. Psychol. Rev. 98, 182–203. doi:
10.1037/0033-295X.98.2.182
Breheny, R., Katsos, N., and Williams, J. (2006). Are generalised scalar
implicatures generated by default? An on-line investigation into the role
of context in generating pragmatic inferences. Cognition 100, 434–463. doi:
10.1016/j.cognition.2005.07.003
Chemla, E., and Singh, R. (2014a). Remarks on the experimental turn in the
study of scalar implicature, Part I. Lang. Linguist. Compass 8, 373–386. doi:
10.1111/lnc3.12081
Chemla, E., and Singh, R. (2014b). Remarks on the experimental turn in the
study of scalar implicature, Part II. Lang. Linguist. Compass 8, 387–399. doi:
10.1111/lnc3.12080
Daneman, M., and Carpenter, P. A. (1980). Individual differences in working
memory and reading. J. Verbal Learn. Verbal Behav. 19, 450–466. doi:
10.1016/S0022-5371(80)90312-6
De Neys, W., and Schaeken, W. (2007). When people are more logical under
cognitive load: dual task impact on scalar implicature. Exp. Psychol. 54, 128–
133. doi: 10.1027/1618-3169.54.2.128
Dieussaert, K., Verkerk, S., Gillard, E., and Schaeken, W. (2011). Some
effort for some: further evidence that scalar implicatures are effortful.
Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 64, 2352–2367. doi: 10.1080/17470218.2011.
588799
Engle, R. W., Tuholski, S. W., Laughlin, J. E., and Conway, A. R. A. (1999). Working
memory, short-term memory, and general fluid in- telligence: a latent-variable
approach. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 128, 309–331. doi: 10.1037/0096-3445.128.
3.309
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 12 November 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1520
fpsyg-07-01520 November 7, 2016 Time: 17:27 # 13
Janssens and Schaeken ‘But’ Implicatures
Feeney, A., Scrafton, S., Duckworth, A., and Handley, S. J. (2004). The story of
some: everyday pragmatic inference by children and adults. Can. J. Exp. Psychol.
58, 121–132. doi: 10.1037/h0085792
Geurts, B. (2010). Quantity Implicatures. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Grice, H. (1975). “Logic and conversation,” in Studies in Syntax and Semantics III:
Speech Acts, eds P. Cole and J. Morgan (New York: Academic Press), 183–198.
Grice, H. (1989). Studies in The Way of Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Grodner, D., Klein, N., Carbary, K., and Tanenhaus, M. (2010). “Some,” and
possibly all, scalar inferences are not delayed: evidence for immediate
pragmatic enrichment. Cognition 116, 42–55. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2010.
03.014
Hall, A. (2004). The meaning of but: a procedural reanalysis. UCL Work. Pap.
Linguist. 16, 199–236.
Hall, A. (2007). Do discourse connectives encode concepts or procedures? Lingua
117, 149–174. doi: 10.1016/j.lingua.2005.10.003
Heyman, T., and Schaeken, W. (2015). Some differences in some: examining
variability in the interpretation of scalars using latent class analysis. Psychol.
Belg. 55, 1–18. doi: 10.5334/pb.bc
Heyman, T., Schaeken, W., and Pipijn, K. (2012). “Logical or pragmatic, as long
as it suits our convenience: scalar inferences in a pro-and contra-attitudinal
context,” in Proceedings of the 34th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science
Society: Building Bridges Across Cognitive Sciences Around the World, eds N.
Miyake, D. Peebles, and R. Cooper (Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society),
456–460.
Horn, L. R. (2004). “Implicature,” in The Handbook of Pragmatics, eds L. R. Horn
and G. Ward (Oxford: Blackwell), 3–28.
Huang, Y., and Snedeker, J. (2009). Online interpretation of scalar quantifiers:
insight into the semantics-pragmatics interface. Cogn. Psychol. 58, 376–415. doi:
10.1016/j.cogpsych.2008.09.001
Iten, C. (2005). Linguistic Meaning, Truth Conditions and Relevance. The Case of
Concessives. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
Jaeger, T. F. (2008). Categorical data analysis: away from ANOVAs (transformation
or not) and towards logit mixed models. J. Mem. Lang. 59, 434–446. doi:
10.1016/j.jml.2007.11.007
Janssens, L., Drooghmans, S., and Schaeken, W. (2015). But: do age and working
memory influence conventional implicature processing? J. Child Lang. 42,
695–708. doi: 10.1017/S0305000914000312
Janssens, L., Fabry, I., and Schaeken, W. (2014). ‘Some’ effects of age, task, task
content and working memory on scalar implicature processing. Psychol. Belg.
54, 374–388. doi: 10.5334/pb.ax
Janssens, L., and Schaeken, W. (2013). ‘But’ how do we reason with it: an
experimental investigation of the implicature stemming from ‘but’. J. Pragmat.
57, 194–209. doi: 10.1016/j.pragma.2013.08.021
Lascarides, A., and Asher, N. (1993). ‘Temporal interpretation, discourse
relations and commonsense entailment’. Linguist. Philos. 16, 437–493. doi:
10.1007/BF00986208
Lewicka, M. (1988). “On objective and subjective anchoring of cognitive acts:
how behavioral valence modifies reasoning schemata,” in Recent Trends in
Theoretical Psychology, eds J. Baker, L. P. Mos, H. V. Rappard, and H. J. Stam
(New York, NY: Springer Verlag), 285–301.
Lewicka, M. (1998). “Confirmation bias: cognitive error or adaptive strategy of
action control?,” in Personal Control in Action. Cognitive and Motivational
Mechanisms, eds M. Kofta, G. Weary, and G. Sedek (New York, NY: Plenum
Press), 233–258.
Marty, P., and Chemla, E. (2013). Scalar implicatures: working memory and a
comparison with ’only’. Front. Psychol 4:403. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00403
Marty, P., Chemla, E., and Spector, B. (2013). Interpreting numerals and
scalar items under memory load. Lingua 133, 152–163. doi: 10.1016/j.lingua.
2013.03.006
Moeschler, J. (2012). “Conversational and conventional implicatures,” in Cognitive
Pragmatics, ed. H.-J. Schmid (Berlin: De Gruyter), 407–436.
Noveck, I. (2001). When children are more logical than adults: experimental
investigations of scalar implicature. Cognition 78, 165–188. doi: 10.1016/S0010-
0277(00)00114-1
Noveck, I., and Posada, A. (2003). Characterizing the time course of an implicature:
an evoked potentials study. Brain Lang. 85, 203–210. doi: 10.1016/S0093-
934X(03)00053-1
Open Science Collaboration (2015). Estimating the reproducibility of psychological
science. Science 349, aac4716. doi: 10.1126/science.aac4716
Peeters, G., and Czapinski, J. (1990). Positive-negative asymmetry in evaluations:
the distinction between affective and informational negativity effects. Eur. Rev.
Soc. Psychol. 1, 33–60. doi: 10.1080/14792779108401856
Potts, C. (2015). “Presupposition and implicature,” in The Handbook of
Contemporary Semantic Theory, 2nd Edn, eds S. Lappin and C. Fox (Oxford:
Wiley-Blackwell), 168–202.
Rips, L. J. (1994). The Psychology of Proof: Deductive Reasoning in Human Thinking.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Rozin, P., and Royzman, E. B. (2001). Negativity bias, negativity dominance,
and contagion. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Rev. 5, 296–320. doi: 10.1207/S1532795
7PSPR0504_2
Schroyens, W., Schaeken, W., and d’Ydewalle, G. (2001). The processing of
negations in conditional reasoning: a meta-analytic case study in mental
model and/or mental logic theory. Think. Reason. 7, 121–172. doi: 10.1080/
13546780042000091
Taylor, S. E. (1991). Asymmetrical effects of positive and negative events:
the mobilization- minimization hypothesis. Psychol. Bull. 110, 67–85. doi:
10.1037/0033-2909.110.1.67
Van Belle, W. (2003). Zwijgen is Niet Altijd Toestemmen. De Rol van Inferenties bij
het Interpreteren en Argumenteren. Leuven: Uitgeverij Acco.
Van Belle, W., and Devroy, G. (1992). Tegenstellende en toegevende connectoren.
Een argumentatieve beschrijving (Preprint 143). KU Leuven, Faculteit Letteren,
Departement Linguïstiek, Leuven.
van Tiel, B., and Schaeken, W. (2016). Processing conversational implicatures:
alternatives and counterfactual reasoning. Cogn. Sci. doi: 10.1111/cogs.12362
[Epub ahead of print].
Verschueren, N., Peeters, G., and Schaeken, W. (2006). Don’t let anything bad
happen: the effect of consequence valence on conditional reasoning. Curr.
Psychol. Lett 20:3.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2016 Janssens and Schaeken. This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use,
distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original
author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal
is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or
reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 13 November 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1520
